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Abstract:  
This paper examined the male-female differentials in hourly earnings in Russia from 1996 to 
2002.   The gender wage gap did not alter significantly in the earlier years, a period 
characterized by economic instability, but as the economy recovered, the differential in earnings 
increased initially.  This trend reversed in 2002 and while the gender wage gap in mean 
earnings fell to its previous level the differential increased at the lower percentiles.  Throughout 
all years, most of the gender wage differential is accounted for by differences in rewards rather 
than differences in observable characteristics.  Occupational segregation continues to be a 
salient feature of the labor market with women clustered in professional, clerical and service 
occupations while men are more predominantly employed in blue-collar jobs.   
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1. Introduction 
The early years of economic transition were characterized by a sharp decline in output and real 
wages.  Women entered economic transition from a position of inequality and segregation.  They 
were concentrated in publicly supported spheres of the economy such as education, healthcare 
and science, sectors that were at risk of budget cuts in the transition to a market economy.     
Men, on the other hand were disproportionately employed in heavy industry, construction, 
transportation and extraction industries, sectors that commanded higher wages.  Since the 
financial crisis in 1998, Russia has experienced economic growth and new jobs have been 
created. While some researchers found that the gender wage gap did not alter significantly in the 
early years of economic transition, others found that women’s relative earnings declined 
significantly, at least in the beginning.  It is of interest to inquire on the impact of the most recent 
economic changes on women’s earnings relative to those of their male counterparts.   
 
The focus of this paper is the analysis of the male-female earnings gap through a period of 
economic instability, 1996 – 1998, and economic recovery, 2000 – 2002 using data from the 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a nationally representative household survey.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the labor market from 
1992 to 2002.  A review of previous research on wage differentials in Russia is presented in 
Section 3.  Theories of gender discrimination are discussed in section 4.  In section 5 the data is 
described with an analysis of mean wage differentials.  The distribution of occupations and 
average earnings by occupation are also analyzed in this section.  The econometric model is 
outlined in section 6 followed by regression results and some concluding remarks are offered in 
section 7.  
 
2. Overview of the Labor Market 
Economic restructuring required the reallocation of labor from obsolete sectors of the economy 
to more productive sectors.  The focus of the economy shifted from heavy industry to production 
of oil and gas for international consumption, importation of consumer goods, and services such 
as banking, finance and marketing.  While output fell significantly between 1992 and 1996, the 
adjustment to employment was small by comparison.  Rather than pursue a strict policy of  
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economic restructuring that would have led to bankruptcy at many enterprises and massive 
layoffs, the government opted to adhere only loosely to the policy of financial stabilization.   
The social safety net was inadequate to cope with high unemployment and enterprise managers 
chose to retain a large labor force rather than see a huge increase in unemployment.  There were 
substantial layoffs, but workers were also put on forced unpaid leave, shortened working hours 
and others continued to work but were not paid.  Workers tolerated wage arrears and low wages 
because of the relative importance of non-wage social benefits provided by the enterprises and 
shortages of housing and the high cost of moving relative to their cash incomes limited 
opportunities for mobility across regions.  
Keeping a large number of employees on the payroll afforded enterprise managers concessions 
from local authorities such as access to credit, payments from employment funds, and other 
privileges
1.  It has been pointed out that less than transparent business practices between large 
enterprises and local authorities prevented the entry of new firms
2, and hindered job creation.  
Also inhibiting efficient job creation is the informal system of recruiting employees at 
enterprises during the post-transition period.  Many managers rely on personal contacts for 
worker searches and on their current employees to spread news of job openings by word-of-
mouth, particularly for blue-collar worker rather than using newspaper advertising or 
headhunters which they resort to only for specialized workers
3.   
Enterprise restructuring was accelerated as a result of a wide-ranging financial crisis in 1998.  
The depreciation of the exchange rate provided a stimulus to the economy through import 
substitution effects, and high oil and other commodity prices on world markets also boosted 
economic growth.  From Table 1 it is evident that the labor market did not show real 
improvement until 2000 when the unemployment rate fell, real wages increased and the level of 
wage arrears declined significantly.  Table 2 shows employment by sector as a percent of 1991, 
or pre-transition level.   The biggest employment losses occurred in construction and industry 
where many blue-collar jobs disappeared.    Employment levels in most other sectors declined 
also except for the Commerce, Service & Marketing sectors, and Administration, Lending & 
Insurance segments where employment levels have almost doubled from 1991.  There is 
                                                 
1 Problems of Economic Transition, August 1998. 
2 OECD Report (2002) 
3 Broadman, Recanatini (2001)  
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evidence that women lost jobs at a greater rate than men in industry and sectors such as science 
and housing services at the beginning of economic reform
4.   
More importantly, there has been open expression of patriarchal attitudes such as ‘women’s 
place being in the home’ rather than an encouragement of the pursuit of their careers
5.  With the 
provision of subsidized child-care greatly reduced, many women faced difficulties in coping with 
full-time market work and household responsibilities.  Some have argued that protective 
legislation, imported from the Soviet era, such as limits on the number of hours pregnant women 
or women with children under the age of three can work, and the type of work they can do, mark 
women as ‘invalids’ and may be used to justify their exclusion from many jobs
6.  At the same 
time, these laws are often ignored in the private sector
7.  On a positive note, recent changes to 
labor laws adopt an egalitarian approach to the distribution of family obligations, such as time 
off to care for sick or disabled children being allowed to either working parent 
8.  There is 
evidence of explicit discrimination against women in the labor market as in job advertisements 
where employers state a preference for males, or for women without children.  Also blatant 
illustrations of discrimination have been noted where advertisements focus on the applicant’s 
appearance rather than the relevant skills necessary to do the job
9.   
 
3. Review of Previous Research 
There is by now an extensive body of research on the labor market in Russia in the post- 
transition period, as well as some studies prior to economic reform.  In the summary of research 
findings on gender pay differentials presented in Table 1, the unadjusted wage gap ranges from 
20 percent to over 40 percent, depending on the data and whether an hourly or monthly wage rate 
is used.  Gregory & Kohlhase (1988) found that the female earnings gap was 18 to 19 percent, 
controlling for occupation and without occupation accounted for in the earnings equation, the 
earnings differential was 22 to 29 percent.  With pre-reform and post-reform data from several 
Eastern European countries as well as data from Russia and Ukraine, Brainerd (2000) concluded 
                                                 
4 Sachs (1999) 
5 Buckley (1997) 
6 Bridger, Kay & Pinnick (1996) 
7 Feminization of Poverty: World Bank  (2000) 
8 Problems of Economic Transition (2001) 
9 Bridger, Kay & Pinnick (1996)  
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that the widening of the wage gap in Russia and Ukraine is attributable to an increase in 
inequality in incomes in general in these two countries whereas gender wage differentials 
narrowed in Eastern European countries.  Katz (1997), in her examination of data from a 
household survey conducted in the industrial city, Taganrog in 1989 surmised that while one 
third of the male-female wage differential was explained by differences in education, experience, 
qualification level and work conditions, women earned less because they were women and 
because of the lower value placed on what was considered ‘women’s work’. 
 
The rest of the research used RLMS data.  Newell and Reilly (1996) reported that the 30 percent 
wage differential (1992) was mostly accounted for by differences in treatment rather than by 
differences in characteristics and the failure of women to advance within sectors rather than 
segregation.  Using RLMS (1994) data to examine gender wage differentials, Arabsheibani & 
Lau (1999) noted that discrimination accounted for a lower portion of the wage differential when 
the model is corrected for selection bias using Heckman’s method.  Reilly (1997) found the 
transition process had an approximately neutral effect on the unadjusted gender wage gap during 
the 1992 to1996 period. 
 
Results of a study by Gerry, Kim, Lee (2001) using RLMS data from 1994 to 1998 suggest that 
wage arrears and payment-in-kind helped limit the gender gap as women who experienced a 
higher wage differential were compensated with these substitutes.  Glinskaya & Mroz (2001) 
concluded that inequality in the lower percentiles declined from 1992 to 1996 from their analysis 
of RLMS data but increased at the upper ends of the distribution and the increase in the gender 
wage gap during that period could not be explained by changes in production characteristics. 
 
 
 
4. Explanations for Gender Pay Differentials 
In western capitalist economies gender earnings differentials are usually attributed to women 
having less market experience, and less education or marketable skills.  These theories are 
inappropriate to apply to the Russian economy where women had at least as high if not a higher  
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level of education than men
10, on average, and for several decades up to 90 percent of them were 
either in the labor force or in school.  Another explanation offered for the gender wage gap is 
that the longer hours that women spend on housework may lower the effort they put into their 
market jobs, compared to men.  The double burden of household responsibilities and full-time 
work hampered women’s ability to compete with men in the labor market and in order to cope, 
women chose jobs that had more flexible work schedules or were close to home.   
 
The “crowding hypothesis”
11 posits that women earn lower wages on average because employers 
exclude them from jobs considered “men’s work” and with women crowded into other 
occupations, typically described as “women’s work”, mean wages in these jobs are reduced.  
Studies of female employment and wages in the US have shown that predominantly female 
occupations pay lower wages
12.  In McAuley’s (1981) analysis of the Soviet labor market (1970 
census data), he noted that while women’s employment opportunities had expanded beyond 
those available to women in western countries, women did not achieve positions of high skill or 
prestige compared to men.  Most women were to be found in jobs of lower skill levels while the 
majority of those in jobs of higher skill levels were men.  Since wages scales were set according 
to the skill grades assigned to the job and sector, women earned less than men because of their 
lower skill grades and despite their education levels.  Another explanation for the gender wage 
gap put forward by Blau & Kahn (1996, 1997, 2000), focuses not only on relative labor market 
qualifications and experience, but also on wage structure, or the prices of labor market skills.  
Their research suggests that a higher level of wage inequality may result in a larger differential in 
earnings because women are concentrated more in lower-paying sectors of the labor market.    
 
5. Data 
The data for this paper also comes from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) 
using the six most recent rounds of the survey: round 6 (1996), round 7 (1997), round 8 (1998), 
round 9 (2000), round 10 (2001) and round 11 (2002)
13.  The sample is restricted to the working 
age population, males aged 18 to 60, and females aged 18 to 55 who reported a positive wage in 
                                                 
10 Feminization of Poverty in Russia: World Bank 
11 Bergman (1974) 
12 Sorensen (1990) 
13 Information on the survey, and the data is available at www.unc.edu/cpc/projects/rlms.  
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the previous month.  The wage variable is the sum of reported after-tax wage earnings in 
December 2000 prices from their primary job (which excludes pensions, bonuses, subsidies and 
payments from welfare) plus an estimate of goods received in lieu of wages.  The monthly wage 
is divided by the number of hours worked to get an hourly wage and the natural logarithm is 
taken of this wage after it was deflated by the consumer price index from Russian Economic 
Trends.  The wage variable for periods prior to 1998 is divided by 1000, which is approximately 
the magnitude of the currency devaluation that occurred. 
 
  5.1 The Gender Wage Gap 
 Table 2 shows the gender gap in the mean wage by year.  Mean wages for men exhibit greater 
dispersion than those for women as measured by the standard deviation.  Average earnings for 
both men and women fell between 1996 and 1998 but women’s average wages have increased 38 
percent compared to an increase of 35 percent for men’s wages.   The male-female differential in 
mean wages remained at about the same level in 1996 and 1997 and declined in 1998.  It reached 
its highest level in 2000 and 2001 and the sharp increase in women’s average earnings in 2002 
reduced the wage gap substantially.  Fewer men who worked in the previous month report 
wages, and this analysis does not take wage arrears into account. This may explain why the 
female-male wage ratio appears high in the earlier years as men experienced wage arrears to a 
greater degree than women in this sample.  These differentials suggest that there has not been an 
improvement in women’s relative pay position in post-transition Russia overall, compared to 
some degree of progress for women in western nations.  In their analysis of earnings in many 
western nations, Blau & Kahn (2000) reported a narrowing of the gender wage gap in the 1990s, 
particularly in the United States.   While on the one hand, Russian women appear to fare as well 
as many of their western counterparts earning 80 percent of male wages on average, by the late 
1990s in some countries (Australia, France, Belgium), the female-male average wage ratio was 
as high as 90 percent. 
 
Figure 1 shows the changes in the gender pay gap by selected percentiles for some years (all 
years are not included as the graph becomes unreadable).  The percentile rankings refer to each 
sex group’s own wage distribution.  The gender wage gap appears to be relatively constant at the 
25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile in most years.  In 1996, the biggest gap in earnings is at the  
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90
th percentile.  In 2000 the differential increased dramatically at the top half of the wage 
distribution, but by 2002, the differential has declined except at the lower portion of the wage 
distribution, at the 10
th and 25
th percentiles.   
Economic transition in Russia was characterized by a sharp increase in wage inequality and from 
the top panel of Table 5 we see that between 1996 and 2001, males in the 90
th percentile earned 
10 to 11 times as much as their male counterparts in the 10
th percentile.  The 90-10 percentile 
differential is somewhat lower for females but it is interesting that this differential declined by 
over 30 percent for males and 40 percent for females between 2000 and 2002.  The differential in 
average earnings for men and women, in both the top half of the wage distribution (90-50 
percentile differential) and the bottom half of the distribution (50-10 percentile differential) 
remained relatively constant throughout all years. 
 
5.2 Occupational Segregation and Differences in Average Wages by Occupation  
Table 6 shows the distribution of occupations for the total from 1996 to 2002 and Table 7 shows 
average wages and average hours worked by gender in each occupation.  In his analysis of Soviet 
census data, McCauley (1981) noted that women’s occupations chiefly involved caring for the 
sick and young, teaching and clerical work, while men were more likely to be engaged in work 
involving managerial and technical skills.  Occupational segregation is still a salient feature of 
the Russian labor market as is shown in Table 6.  Men work more in blue-collar craft-related jobs 
and as operators while women are concentrated in white-collar professional positions, the 
technical medical field, the services industry and clerical jobs and during the post-transition 
period there has not been a significant shift in the broad categories of occupations held by men 
and women.  
 
The bottom panel of Table 6 shows that women make up to 94 percent of clerks, up to 78 percent 
of service workers, 80 percent of technical workers and between 68 and 81 percent of women 
work as professionals.  These ‘professional’ positions held by women, when broken down, are 
most frequently secondary and primary school teaching and nursing.  Within this category are 
also economists, professors, accountants and architects but they are a smaller share of the total.   
The highest wages are earned by those in managerial positions, 44 to 49 percent of whom were 
females in 2000 - 2002, and the gender wage gap was highest in this occupation category in  
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almost every year before 2001 and 2002, when it narrowed significantly.  Up to 80 percent of 
technical/medical workers are women and their earnings are significantly lower than those of 
men, except in 2001.  In this category of occupations, more than 50 percent of women work as 
nurses, bookkeepers and pre-primary school teachers while more men work in higher-paying 
jobs such as trade brokers, technical/commercial sales representatives and police inspectors.     
The gender wage differential for professional occupations appears to be increasing in recent 
years, as it is for service workers.  Female clerks are poorly paid compared to their male 
counterparts in earlier years but the gap in average wages has narrowed here.  The smallest wage 
differential is observed among craft workers and elementary/unskilled occupations and women 
who work as operators also fare well compared to their counterparts in more skilled (white 
collar) occupations. 
 
5.3 Comparison of Average Hours Worked 
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows that women’s commitment to the labor force as measured by 
average weekly hours worked, is only marginally lower than that of males. Women work on 
average 90 percent or more of male hours, and their average weekly hours are lower than the 
legal 41-hour workweek in almost every occupation. This either indicates that many women are 
dividing their time between household responsibilities and market work or they are not being 
afforded the opportunity to work as many hours as they wish.  Women working as 
managers/officials put in the most hours at an average of 44 hours per week in 2002, while those 
in unskilled and elementary positions work the least hours, up to ten hours less than men.   
However, Katz (1994) noted that in the Soviet system, cleaning jobs were unpopular and hard to 
fill and managers were likely to allow people time off, unofficially, to care for children and do 
household chores.  Up to 45 percent of women in this category are cleaners but is doubtful that 
this explains why these employees work well below full-time hours in the post-transition period.   
 
6. Model and Estimation 
In empirical studies on wage discrimination, it is common to use an approach developed by 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), where discrimination is defined as the difference between the 
observed male-female wage ratio and the wage ratio that would prevail if men and women were 
paid according to the same criteria.  In this approach, the wage of an individual is determined by  
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productive characteristics such as level of work experience, education, and other indicators that 
are used to measure one’s marginal productivity.  Usually, female wage equations are corrected 
for selection bias since a substantial number of women do not work and their potential wage 
offers cannot be observed
14.  Wage equations were estimated to account for selection bias using 
Heckman’s Mill’s Ratio but the inclusion of the correction term in the wage models did not 
produce a satisfactory result.  Wage equations are specified to relate the natural logarithm of 
earnings as a function of individual characteristics:  
 
β   X      W ln  = +   u  where X is a vector of productivity related variables 
To compute the wage differential let  
 
    X      W ln  m m m β′ = ′        ( 1 )  
 
be the natural log of the average male wage and  
 
f W ln  f   f X       β′ = ′        ( 2 )  
 
be the natural log of the average female wage.  
 
m W and f W     is the natural logarithm of average male and females wages, respectively and  m X ′  
and  f X ′are average male and female explanatory variables such as education, labor force 
experience, etc and  m β  and  f β are the estimated coefficients of the male and female regressions. 
Following the Oaxaca (1973) methodology, the wage differential can be expressed as: 
 
f f m m f m X   -     X      W ln     -   W ln  β β ′ ′ = ′ ′      (3) 
 
and it may be decomposed in two ways: 
 
                                                 
14 Heckman (1979)  
 
 
 
 
 
10
Let  = ∆X   f m X   -   X        ( 4 )  
 
or the difference in average characteristics 
 
and the difference in rewards to these characteristics is: 
 
= ∆β f m   -     β β ′ ′       ( 5 )  
 
Then the wage differential may be expressed as: 
 
  W ln     -   W ln  f m =  m β′ ∆X  +  β ∆ f X      (6) 
 
or  
 
f m W ln     -   W ln  =  f β′ ∆X  +     X   m β ∆      (7) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of either (6) or (7) is the log wage differential due to 
differences in average characteristics and the second term is the differential due to different 
coefficients or the difference in male and female wage structures.  In a world of no wage 
discrimination, males and females would receive the same returns for the same characteristics 
and the second term can be interpreted as the part of the log wage differential due to 
discrimination.  Equations (6) and (7) will yield different results as (6) evaluates the differences 
in average characteristics using the male wage structure and  β ∆ f X  gives the differences in 
coefficients or a measure of discrimination using female weights.  In equation (7), 
f β′ ∆X evaluates differences in average characteristics employing the female wage structure and 
   X   m β ∆ is the difference due to different rewards using male weights.   
 
The explanatory variables in the model include controls for marital status, children under 7 years 
old, and age and its squared provide a proxy for labor market experience.  Four levels of  
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education are controlled for in the model, university and postgraduate diploma, technical and 
medical school diploma, vocational training, secondary school education, and primary school 
education or less serves as the omitted category.  Occupations are classified according to one-
digit ISCO classifications: legislators, senior managers and officials; professionals; technicians 
and associated professionals; clerks; service and market workers; craft and related occupations; 
plant and machine operators and the omitted category is unskilled and elementary occupations.  
Two occupation classifications have been excluded from this analysis, namely agricultural and 
fishery workers and army personnel.  A variable indicating whether or not an individual works in 
the private sector in a foreign-owned or Russian-owned firm is also included in the model as well 
as a control for supervisory status in one’s job.  Following Glinskaya & Mroz (2001), a variable 
indicating whether or not an individual is engaged in entrepreneurial activity is incorporated into 
the models to measure the rewards associated with a business owner’s willingness to take risks, 
or unobservable skills.  Brainerd (1998) theorized that such an indicator might possibly explain 
more of the gender gap if women and men differ in these characteristics.  Variables indicating 
ownership or co-ownership were not added, however, as it was found that these did not improve 
the overall fit of the model and this information was missing on several observations, which 
would reduce the sample size even more.  Controls for nine regions are also included in the 
model with the north and northwest region serving as the omitted category. 
 
6.1 Model Results 
Tables 8 and 8A present the regression results for the male and female wage models.  For the 
Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition to properly estimate wage differentials a well-specified human 
capital model is necessary and this data does not provide a good fit for the model on the whole, 
compared to data in western capitalist economies.  The male wage equations provide a poor fit in 
all years except 2002, while the female wage models improve over time, explaining 14 to 27 
percent of the variation in wages.  Both sets of equations fit best in 2002, with the highest 
adjusted R
2  and more statistically significant variables.  Indeed, many of the variables one 
expects to explain the variation in earnings are not statistically significant in these models.   
 
The education and occupation variables are not statistically significant in many years and 
sometimes the education coefficients do not have the expected sign, such as the coefficient on  
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university for males, which is negative in 1996 and 2002.  This indicates that there are other 
factors that are not observable determining one’s earnings, especially considering that the control 
groups are primary school or less for education, and unskilled/elementary occupations.  Male 
managers earn up to 80 percent more than those in unskilled/elementary occupations, the control 
group, while for women this same coefficient is only significant in 2001 and 2002, when the 
gender wage gap in this occupation category decreased sharply.  Working as operators and in 
craft-related jobs is more beneficial for women and these occupations also are more highly 
remunerated for men.   This strongly suggests that women have salaries similar to those of men 
when they work in male-dominated occupations.  Private sector employment has a strong, 
statistically significant positive effect on earnings for both genders and this is particularly true in 
2000 and 2001 for females.  There is also a premium of up 41 percent attached to working in an 
entrepreneurial capacity for women, but this declines from 2000 onwards, and in 2001 it is not 
statistically significant.  For men, this does not have a statistically significant impact on their 
earnings.   
 
Variables indicating family status are statistically significant in the male models only and for 
some years.  Married men earn more than their single or divorced counterparts in every year 
although this advantage decreases over time.  For females, marriage does not appear to have a 
statistically significant impact on their wages while the presence of children under the age of 
seven in the household has a negative impact on earnings for both men and women in later years 
but this is not statistically significant.  The age/earnings profile is flat for men and women in all 
years and the age variables are not statistically significant, most of the time.   
 
Women in the Moscow/St. Petersburg area have increasingly higher earnings on average, than 
those in the north/northwest, the control region, while wages are declining over time for women 
in most other regions.  This may be explained in part by the fact that credit, finance and 
insurance as well as computing and information services are particularly strong industries in the 
Moscow/St. Petersburg region, sectors that may be favorable to employing women
15.  One of the 
features of the Soviet economy was the concentration of one or two industries in a region, with 
economic transition regions rich in natural resources could take advantage of newly liberalized 
                                                 
15 Sachs (1999)  
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export markets while those that specialized in the production of machinery and consumer goods 
found their that their output could not compete with foreign goods.  Unemployment did not 
decline in many regions following the currency devaluation in 1998 and even increased in some, 
and these results appear to highlight the disparities in income across regions
16.  The same 
patterns are evident for men except that the Moscow/St. Petersburg area is only marginally 
advantageous for men, and this is not statistically significant.   
 
6.2 Decomposition of Wage Differentials 
Table 9 presents the decomposition of the gender wage differentials.  In the top panel, the male-
female wage differential for each year is outlined and the two lower panels show the breakdowns 
of the wage differential using the male and female characteristics and wage structures for each 
year as bases for comparison.  In the second panel it is shown that if men had been paid 
according to the female reward structure (Z’Male ∆β), they would have received approximately 
15 percent less in 1996 and 1997 and 21 to 25 percent less in 2000-2002.  It is also evident that 
the differential in earnings that can be ascribed to differences in the way men and women are 
rewarded ranges from 63 to 98 percent of the in 1996-1998 and from 71 percent in 2000 to 90 
percent in 2002.  The remaining 21 to 37 percent of the wage differential is due to differences in 
average characteristics (∆Zβ Female), most of which are occupational.   Occupations account for 
22 to 52 percent of the differential and entrepreneurial activity makes up 5 percent of the 
difference in observable characteristics in 1996 and 6 percent in 1998, but by 2000 and 2001 this 
effect has declined to 1 to 2 percent.  Private sector employment is more important in explaining 
the difference in earnings in 2000 to 2002, compared to earlier years and in 2002, almost 20 
percent of the differential is explained by supervisory status rather than occupations. 
 
Women have more education than men on average and sometimes education brings up wages 
more for women than for men, hence the decomposition contains a negative term in both of up to 
19 percent for education variables in the female equations.  In the third panel of the table, using 
the male reward structure and average female characteristics (Z' Female ∆β) this term reduces the 
differential from 5 to 32 percent.  Also, if women had been paid according to the male reward 
structure, they would have received 19 percent more in 1997 and 27 percent more in 2002.  The 
                                                 
16 Boardman, Recanatini (2001)  
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bottom panel of table 7 shows that using average female characteristics as the base and the male 
reward structure, 62 percent of the gender wage gap is attributable to differences in rewards in 
1996, and 97 percent in 2001.  Differences in the distribution of occupations account for most of 
the wage differential attributable to differences in characteristics, except in 2001 when private 
sector employment appears to play a more important role.  When the male reward structure is 
used, entrepreneurial activity accounts for no more than 3 percent of the difference in observable 
characteristics in any year.    
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the gender gap in earnings in Russia from different perspectives, through 
years of severe economic hardship and a period of stability and growth.  In the 2000-2001 period 
when the economy was expanding at a fast rate, the unadjusted gap in mean earnings increased 
and the unadjusted wage gap widened at almost parts of the wage distribution compared to 1996.  
By 2002, however, the differential between average male and female earnings declined to the 
1996 level but the differential increased at the lower percentiles while narrowing at the 90
th 
percentile.  Earnings inequality in men’s and women’s own earnings as measured by the 
disparity between higher percentiles and lower percentiles was significantly reduced between 
1996 and 2002.   Another finding in this analysis is that there are no strong indications of an 
improvement in women’s employment opportunities during the post-transition period judging by 
the continued segregation of occupations.  The type of analysis conducted here has limitations 
and further insights could be gained through an examination of changes in the wage structure 
over the period but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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TABLE 1
National Economic Indicators for Russian Federation: 1991-2002
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GDP (% Growth) -5.0% -14.5% -8.7% -12.7% -4.1% -3.4% 0.9% -4.9% 5.4% 9.0% 5.0% 4.3%
CPI (% percent change year-over-year) N.A. 2508.8% 847.2% 307.7% 131.3% 21.8% 11.0% 84.4% 36.5% 20.1% 18.6% 15.1%
Total Employment N.A. 71,581 69,863 68,675 66,409 65,950 64,693 63,812 63,963 64,327 64,710 65,766
Unemployment Rate (ILO Definition) N.A. 4.8% 5.9% 7.7% 9.2% 9.3% 11.1% 12.3% 12.6% 9.8% 8.9% 8.6%
Real Wages (% Growth) N.A. -40.0% 0.0% -80.0% -28.0% 6.4% 5.7% -13.3% -22.0% 20.9% 19.9% 16.2%
Wage Arrears  (mils of real rubles, end of year, 1992 prices) N.A. 3.6 9.2 17.4 42.4 98.1 106 71.7 31.1 20.1 16.5 N.A.
Hidden Unemployment:
Shortened Workday  (thousands-average of 4 quarters) N.A. N.A. 1,127 4,382 2,047 3,209 2,503 3,354 2,490 1,297 946 900
Forced Leave  (thousands-average of 4 quarters) N.A. N.A. 3,321 6,604 2,089 2,132 2,127 3,866 2,653 1,685 1,556 1,477
TABLE 2
Employment by Sector 
        Percent of 1991 Level
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Industry 100.0% 95.2% 92.9% 82.9% 76.6% 73.0% 66.5% 63.2% 63.8% 64.9% 65.6% N.A.
Agriculture and Forestry 100.0% 103.7% 103.8% 105.6% 100.3% 95.4% 88.6% 89.9% 87.6% 86.3% 82.2% N.A.
Construction 100.0% 92.3% 84.1% 80.0% 73.1% 69.2% 66.7% 60.0% 59.9% 58.9% 59.1% N.A.
Transportation & Communication 100.0% 97.9% 94.1% 93.1% 91.3% 90.8% 89.1% 84.4% 85.5% 87.1% 87.2% N.A.
Commerce, Food Service, Marketing & Procurement 100.0% 100.9% 113.3% 115.3% 118.7% 120.8% 155.1% 165.5% 165.7% 167.5% 177.7% N.A.
Public Health, Social Security, Education, Art, Culture & Science 100.0% 98.0% 95.6% 94.9% 93.7% 93.1% 90.6% 89.2% 89.0% 88.7% 88.8% N.A.
Administrative staff, Lending & State Insurance 100.0% 94.2% 1.1% 115.5% 137.6% 175.2% 170.4% 178.2% 182.7% 186.0% 186.0% N.A.
Other (Housing, Publishing, Utilities, Gen. Svcs.) 100.0% 100.2% 94.0% 92.0% 93.6% 101.6% 96.2% 96.8% 99.0% 101.2% 101.9% N.A. 
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TABLE 3
                                      Summary of Research on Wage Differentials in Russia
Year of 
Publication Author(s) Data Unadjusted Wage Differential
1988 Gregory & Kohlhase Soviet Interview Project  1979-1982 22 - 29% Adjusted  Monthly Wage Gap
1994 Katz Household Survey, City of Taganrog 1989 17% Monthly Wage Gap                                          
27% Hourly Wage Gap
1996 Newell & Reilly RLMS 1992 30% Hourly Wage Gap
1999 Arabsheibani & Lau RLMS 1995 37% Monthly Wage Gap
1999 Reilly RLMS 1992-1996 1992: Monthly - 46%, Hourly - 28% Wage Gap       
1996: Monthly - 44%, Hourly - 28% Wage Gap       
2000 Brainerd Household Surveys, 1991 & 1994 1991: 20% Monthly Wage  Gap                               
1994: 32% Monthly Wage Gap
2000 Gerry, Kim & Lee RLMS 1994-1998 29% Hourly Wage Gap
2001 Glinskaya, Mroz RLMS 1992-1995 28% to 39% Hourly Wage Gap
TABLE 4
GAP IN MEAN WAGES BY YEAR/ROUND
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
(Round 6) (Round 7) (Round 8) (Round 9) (Round 10) (Round 11)
Log Male Wage 2.460 2.577 2.090 2.272 2.538 2.830
Std Deviation (0.944) (0.913) (0.847) (0.898) (0.948) (0.873)
Log Female Wage 2.232 2.347 1.886 1.955 2.226 2.600
Std Deviation (0.874) (0.898) (0.849) (0.844) (0.877) (0.806)
Differential 0.228 0.230 0.204 0.317 0.312 0.230
No. of Males 887 736 590 758 733 862
No. of Females 996 881 877 1,113 1,138 1,298
Female/Male Wage Ratio 79.6% 79.5% 81.5% 72.8% 73.2% 79.5% 
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TABLE 5
            HOURLY PERCENTILE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 1996-2002
MALES
YEAR 90th - 10th  50th - 10th  90th - 50th 
Percentile Percentile Percentile
1996 2.402 1.205 1.197
1997 2.310 1.206 1.105
1998 2.310 1.206 1.105
2000 2.367 1.253 1.114
2001 2.380 1.212 1.168
2002 2.095 1.130 0.965
FEMALES
YEAR 90th - 10th  50th - 10th  90th - 50th 
Percentile Percentile Percentile
1996 2.153 1.024 1.128
1997 2.225 1.077 1.148
1998 2.218 1.081 1.137
2000 2.337 1.243 1.094
2001 2.037 1.023 1.013
2002 1.986 0.977 1.009 
 
 
 
 
 
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    TABLE  6
OCCUPATION DISTRIBUTION - TOTAL 
1996 1997 1998 2000                       2001 2002
Managers 90 4.8% 16 1.0% 39 2.7% 120 6.4% 162 8.7% 148 6.9%
Professionals 336 17.8% 367 22.7% 317 21.6% 370 19.8% 420 22.4% 446 20.6%
Technical 336 17.8% 277 17.1% 304 20.7% 347 18.5% 334 17.9% 414 19.2%
Clerks 143 7.6% 139 8.6% 105 7.2% 116 6.2% 121 6.5% 144 6.7%
Service 169 9.0% 146 9.0% 121 8.2% 187 10.0% 194 10.4% 222 10.3%
Craft 304 16.1% 253 15.6% 204 13.9% 267 14.3% 214 11.4% 278 12.9%
Operators 318 16.9% 252 15.6% 227 15.5% 291 15.6% 265 14.2% 301 13.9%
Elementary/Unskilled 187 9.9% 167 10.3% 150 10.2% 173 9.2% 161 8.6% 207 9.6%
Total 1,883 1,617 1,467 1,871 1,871 2,160
MALE OCCUPATION DISTRIBUTION
1996 1997 1998 2000                       2001 2002
Managers 57 63.3% 10 62.5% 17 43.6% 67 55.8% 86 53.1% 76 51.4%
Professionals 108 32.1% 119 32.4% 79 24.9% 69 18.6% 84 20.0% 104 23.3%
Technical 66 19.6% 67 24.2% 60 19.7% 73 21.0% 74 22.2% 91 22.0%
Clerks 16 11.2% 12 8.6% 11 10.5% 7 6.0% 8 6.6% 17 11.8%
Service 57 33.7% 46 31.5% 36 29.8% 40 21.4% 47 24.2% 50 22.5%
Craft 256 84.2% 204 80.6% 165 80.9% 214 80.1% 177 82.7% 228 82.0%
Operators 260 81.8% 191 75.8% 160 70.5% 216 74.2% 181 68.3% 202 67.1%
Elementary/Unskilled 67 35.8% 87 52.1% 62 41.3% 72 41.6% 76 47.2% 94 45.4%
Total 887 47.1% 736 45.5% 590 40.2% 758 40.5% 733 39.2% 862 39.9%
FEMALE OCCUPATION DISTRIBUTION
1996 1997 1998 2000                       2001 2002
Managers 33 36.7% 6 37.5% 22 56.4% 53 44.2% 76 46.9% 72 48.6%
Professionals 228 67.9% 248 67.6% 238 75.1% 301 81.4% 336 80.0% 342 76.7%
Technical 270 80.4% 210 75.8% 244 80.3% 274 79.0% 260 77.8% 323 78.0%
Clerks 127 88.8% 127 91.4% 94 89.5% 109 94.0% 113 93.4% 127 88.2%
Service 112 66.3% 100 68.5% 85 70.2% 147 78.6% 147 75.8% 172 77.5%
Craft 48 15.8% 49 19.4% 39 19.1% 53 19.9% 37 17.3% 50 18.0%
Operators 58 18.2% 61 24.2% 67 29.5% 75 25.8% 84 31.7% 99 32.9%
Elementary/Unskilled 120 64.2% 80 47.9% 88 58.7% 101 58.4% 85 52.8% 113 54.6%
Total 996 52.9% 881 54.5% 877 59.8% 1,113 59.5% 1,138 60.8% 1,298 60.1% 
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                                                      TABLE 7
                                         AVERAGE WAGE GAP BY OCCUPATION
1996 1997 1998                     2000 2001                 2002
Male Female Diff Male Female Diff Male Female Diff Male Female Diff Male Female Diff Male Female Diff
Officials/Mgrs 2.98 2.56 0.42 3.55 2.81 0.74 2.65 2.05 0.60 2.68 1.89 0.80 2.97 2.63 0.34 3.13 2.95 0.19
Professionals 2.49 2.43 0.06 2.75 2.51 0.24 2.40 2.05 0.35 2.32 2.13 0.19 2.67 2.36 0.31 3.10 2.77 0.33
Technical 2.75 2.26 0.50 2.93 2.27 0.66 2.37 1.82 0.55 2.52 2.04 0.48 2.78 2.62 0.16 3.05 2.61 0.44
Clerks 2.47 2.15 0.32 2.70 2.27 0.43 1.88 1.84 0.03 1.96 1.84 0.12 2.32 2.24 0.08 2.83 2.66 0.17
Service 2.44 2.09 0.35 2.48 2.16 0.32 2.00 1.82 0.18 2.12 1.69 0.44 2.26 1.77 0.49 2.92 2.29 0.63
Craft 2.45 2.31 0.14 2.51 2.40 0.11 1.96 1.91 0.05 2.22 2.16 0.06 2.51 2.34 0.17 2.84 2.75 0.09
Operators 2.40 2.37 0.03 2.56 2.59 -0.03 2.07 1.87 0.20 2.31 2.06 0.25 2.49 2.28 0.21 2.69 2.53 0.16
Elmntry/Unsk 1.94 1.82 0.12 2.17 2.12 0.05 1.75 1.70 0.05 1.73 1.56 0.17 2.06 1.91 0.16 2.33 2.23 0.10
                                             AVERAGE HOURS WORKED BY OCCUPATION
1996 1997 1998                     2000 2001                 2002
Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male Female/Male
Male Female  Ratio Male Female  Ratio Male Female  Ratio Male Female  Ratio Male Female  Ratio Male Female  Ratio
45.2 45.8 101.2% 55.2 43.7 79.1% 51.9 43.8 84.4% 45.3 41.3 91.2% 45.3 42.2 93.2% 47.4 44.4 93.6%
Professionals 38.3 34.3 89.6% 41.4 35.2 85.0% 39.2 34.3 87.4% 39.3 35.5 90.2% 36.7 35.3 96.1% 39.8 33.5 84.2%
Technical/Med 39.4 36.7 93.2% 41.8 38.5 91.9% 41.8 36.0 86.0% 40.5 37.5 92.6% 44.0 37.1 84.4% 41.9 38.0 90.7%
Clerks 34.5 36.4 105.5% 40.6 40.6 99.9% 41.3 34.3 83.0% 45.1 39.6 87.7% 51.1 43.1 84.4% 45.9 39.3 85.6%
Service 49.9 39.2 78.6% 45.8 38.1 83.2% 45.1 42.6 94.5% 45.8 42.0 91.7% 50.0 37.9 75.7% 43.6 40.3 92.5%
Craft 38.2 36.0 94.2% 41.4 34.9 84.3% 39.1 38.8 99.3% 42.1 38.2 90.7% 40.1 34.6 86.2% 40.8 35.4 86.6%
Operators 39.2 34.4 87.6% 42.6 33.6 78.8% 39.9 37.9 94.9% 42.9 41.0 95.4% 43.2 37.4 86.7% 45.1 40.6 90.1%
Elmntry/Unsk 42.8 34.4 80.2% 42.2 34.0 80.4% 43.9 33.2 75.7% 42.2 34.4 81.5% 43.6 33.6 77.0% 42.4 32.2 75.9%
Sample Avg 41.2 36.2 87.9% 42.3 37.0 87.4% 40.8 36.1 88.4% 42.4 37.8 89.2% 42.0 37.6 89.7% 42.7 37.0 86.8% 
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TABLE 8
Regressions - Males
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Intercept 1.741 *** 2.483 *** 1.679 *** 0.869 * 1.461 ** 1.434 ***
4.27 5.83 3.78 1.93 3.02 3.20
Married =1 0.099 0.048 0.245 ** 0.219 ** 0.191 * 0.064
1.11 0.52 2.90 2.79 2.41 1.00
Children < 7 =1 -0.054 0.000 -0.035 -0.042 -0.005 -0.006
-0.76 0.00 -0.39 -0.56 -0.06 -0.08
Age 0.014 -0.016 0.005 0.038 0.047 0.060 **
0.66 -0.72 0.23 1.58 1.85 2.87
Age Sqrd 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 **
-0.91 0.45 -0.50 -1.58 -1.75 -2.92
Education Dummy Vars.
University Degree =1 -0.026 0.325 0.573 ** 0.617 ** -0.044 0.241
-0.16 1.84 2.77 3.51 -0.18 0.91
Technical/Medical Ed =1 -0.158 0.258 0.413 * 0.452 ** -0.156 0.114
-1.01 1.56 2.15 2.73 -0.65 0.44
Vocational Training=1 -0.147 0.100 0.206 0.234 -0.224 -0.123
-1.05 0.64 1.17 1.53 -0.96 -0.48
High School =1 -0.143 0.408 ** 0.204 0.403 * -0.327 -0.081
-0.88 2.40 1.02 2.33 -1.05 -0.29
Private Sector=1 0.321 *** 0.141 * 0.146 * 0.171 ** 0.303 *** 0.271 ***
4.87 2.05 2.06 2.70 4.46 4.80
Occupation Dummy Vars.
Manager=1 0.668 *** 0.792 ** 0.415 0.547 *** 0.738 *** 0.498 ***
3.66 2.58 1.67 3.21 4.34 3.37
Professional=1 0.321 * 0.335 * 0.261 0.273 0.459 ** 0.538 ***
2.02 2.35 1.57 1.68 2.85 4.13
Technician/Medical=1 0.598 *** 0.538 *** 0.306 0.425 ** 0.565 *** 0.578 ***
3.72 3.70 1.84 2.79 3.60 4.48
Clerk=1 0.345 0.345 -0.233 0.084 0.240 0.487 **
1.39 1.30 -0.88 0.25 0.72 2.34
Service Worker=1 0.225 0.043 0.145 0.290 0.247 0.645 ***
1.38 0.27 0.83 1.71 1.45 4.48
Craft Worker=1 0.493 *** 0.286 ** 0.155 0.433 *** 0.367 ** 0.563 ***
4.06 2.60 1.31 3.76 2.98 5.80
Operator=1 0.494 *** 0.362 *** 0.269 * 0.504 *** 0.420 *** 0.507 ***
4.05 3.21 2.23 4.33 3.44 5.05
Supervisor=1 0.282 *** 0.186 * 0.063 0.115 -0.025 0.144 *
3.46 2.25 0.65 1.23 -0.28 1.93
Entrepeneurial Activity=1 0.127 0.191 0.133 0.175 0.058 -0.029
1.12 1.37 0.98 1.35 0.44 -0.23
Region Dummy Vars.
Moscow/St. Petersburg=1 0.449 *** 0.218 0.058 0.159 0.040 0.132
3.34 1.52 0.36 0.96 0.24 1.01
W. Siberia=1 0.354 ** 0.057 0.008 -0.233 -0.075 -0.696 ***
2.58 0.37 0.05 -1.65 -0.48 -5.42
Central=1 -0.168 -0.304 * -0.432 *** -0.285 ** -0.414 *** -0.468 ***
-1.38 -2.34 -3.30 -2.36 -3.69 -5.18
Caucas=1 0.019 0.040 -0.387 ** -0.274 * -0.304 ** -0.333 ***
0.15 0.31 -2.88 -2.21 -2.61 -3.41
E. Siberia=1 0.061 -0.215 -0.192 -0.204 -0.289 * -0.380 ***
0.44 -1.40 -1.28 -1.54 -2.22 -3.45
Ural=1 -0.250 * -0.380 ** -0.656 *** -0.526 *** -0.749 *** -0.565 ***
-1.98 -2.68 -4.24 -4.05 -6.11 -5.35
Volga-Vyatski Basin=1 -0.302 ** -0.485 *** -0.576 *** -0.594 *** -0.644 *** -0.700 ***
2.43 -3.55 -4.18 -4.86 -6.08 -8.00
N: 887 736 590 758 733 862
Adjusted R
2 : 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.20
F: 7.95 6.21 4.97 6.36 6.39 9.66
t-statistics in italics * P < .05,  ** P < .01,     *** P < .001 
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TABLE 8A
Regressions - Females
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Intercept 1.410 *** 2.240 *** 0.671 0.344 2.116 *** 1.839 ***
3.29 4.57 1.59 0.97 5.17 4.70
Married =1 0.069 0.041 -0.079 -0.002 0.008 -0.018
1.24 0.65 -1.42 -0.05 0.17 -0.45
Children < 7 =1 -0.029 0.072 0.127 -0.061 -0.105 0.024
-0.47 0.99 1.78 -1.07 -1.81 0.47
Age 0.016 0.006 0.055 * 0.073 *** 0.004 0.033 *
0.69 0.24 2.34 3.87 0.21 1.98
Age Sqrd 0.000 0.000 -0.001 * -0.001 *** 0.000 0.000
-0.56 -0.44 -2.11 -3.74 -0.16 -1.59
Education Dummy Vars.
University/Grad  Degree =1 0.662 *** 0.245 0.428 ** 0.379 ** 0.440 0.304
4.41 1.41 2.70 2.58 1.83 1.28
Technical/Medical Ed =1 0.488 *** 0.022 0.263 0.149 0.119 -0.051
3.49 0.14 1.76 1.07 0.50 -0.22
Vocational Training=1 0.378 ** -0.150 0.159 0.060 -0.025 -0.125
2.71 -0.93 1.06 0.43 -0.11 -0.53
High School =1 0.387 ** 0.029 0.070 -0.014 0.001 0.125
2.55 0.17 0.42 -0.10 0.00 0.50
Private Sector=1 0.264 *** 0.240 *** 0.217 *** 0.406 *** 0.366 *** 0.295 ***
4.33 3.70 3.52 7.91 7.22 7.05
Occupation Dummy Vars.
Manager=1 0.107 0.178 -0.201 -0.077 0.307 * 0.434 ***
0.62 0.48 -1.01 -0.56 2.20 3.66
Professional=1 0.275 ** 0.088 0.099 0.364 *** 0.149 0.360 ***
2.60 0.69 0.87 3.65 1.39 4.19
Technician/Medical=1 0.215 * 0.026 -0.001 0.352 *** 0.158 0.322 ***
2.29 0.23 -0.01 3.73 1.53 3.92
Clerk=1 0.172 0.047 0.014 0.140 0.155 0.303 ***
1.67 0.38 0.12 1.34 1.38 3.31
Service Worker=1 0.068 -0.118 -0.113 -0.008 -0.253 * 0.007
0.64 -0.91 -0.92 -0.08 -2.40 0.08
Craft Worker=1 0.398 *** 0.239 0.164 0.507 *** 0.235 0.439 ***
2.90 1.55 1.08 3.98 1.54 3.69
Operator=1 0.291 * 0.415 *** 0.090 0.400 *** 0.307 ** 0.288 **
2.23 2.88 0.70 3.51 2.57 2.96
Supervisor=1 0.109 0.198 ** 0.271 *** 0.240 *** 0.157 ** 0.080
1.74 2.92 4.06 4.06 2.55 1.55
Entrepeneurial Activity=1 0.347 ** 0.178 0.408 ** 0.242 * 0.072 0.168
2.87 1.34 3.07 2.11 0.60 1.73
Region Dummy Vars.
Moscow/St. Petersburg=1 0.036 0.184 0.182 0.320 ** 0.257 * 0.211 *
0.32 1.50 1.45 2.70 2.07 2.15
W. Siberia=1 -0.007 0.066 0.058 -0.066 -0.322 *** -0.563 ***
-0.06 0.51 0.44 -0.65 -3.38 -6.21
Central=1 -0.419 *** -0.336 ** -0.334 *** -0.325 *** -0.616 *** -0.440 ***
-4.04 -2.94 -3.10 -3.72 -8.46 -7.18
Caucas=1 -0.397 *** -0.294 ** -0.354 ** -0.454 *** -0.437 *** -0.488 ***
-3.78 -2.47 -3.11 -4.98 -5.49 -7.50
E. Siberia=1 -0.107 0.095 0.007 -0.151 -0.312 *** -0.387 ***
-0.90 0.68 0.05 -1.48 -3.26 -4.67
Ural=1 -0.651 *** -0.443 *** -0.507 *** -0.559 *** -0.717 *** -0.693 ***
-5.57 -3.30 -4.02 -5.65 -7.92 -4.67
Volga-Vyatski Basin=1 -0.720 *** -0.504 *** -0.507 *** -0.526 *** -0.771 *** -0.711 ***
-6.85 -4.20 -4.52 -5.86 -9.99 -11.36
N: 996 881 877 1,113 1,138 1,298
R
2 : 0.20 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.27
F: 11.07 6.91 8.16 15.21 16.06 19.91
t-statistics in italics * P < .05, ** P < .01 *** P < .001 
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TABLE 9   
Difference in log earnings 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Log (wage male) - log(wage fem) 0.229 0.230 0.204 0.318 0.313 0.232
Male Characteristics and Female Reward Structure
Z' MALE ∆β Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff
Total due to differences in rewards 0.1504 65.8 0.146 63.3 0.200 98.2 0.226 71.2 0.247 79.1 0.209 90.1
Due to difference in endowments: TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
∆Zβ FEMALE
Age -0.0050 -2.2 -0.007 -3.1 -0.018 -8.6 -0.019 -6.1 0.000 -0.1 -0.006 -2.7
Marital Status 0.010 4.2 0.006 2.5 -0.012 -5.6 0.000 -0.1 0.001 0.3 -0.003 0.4
Children < 7 -0.0006 -0.3 0.001 0.6 0.004 1.8 -0.003 -1.0 -0.007 -2.1 0.001 -13.6
Education -0.0306 -13.4 -0.031 -13.7 -0.039 -19.1 -0.040 -12.6 -0.044 -13.9 -0.031 -13.6
Occupations 0.0733 32.1 0.119 51.6 0.045 22.0 0.073 23.0 0.073 23.5 -0.006 -2.6
Supervisor 0.0035 1.5 0.001 0.6 0.004 1.8 0.005 1.6 0.008 2.4 0.045 19.6
Entrepeneurial Activity 0.0121 5.3 0.002 0.8 0.012 5.8 0.006 1.9 0.002 0.8 0.004 1.7
Private sector 0.0152 6.7 0.012 5.3 0.017 8.1 0.071 22.4 0.043 13.8 0.028 11.9
Regions 0.0007 0.3 -0.018 -8.0 -0.009 -4.3 -0.001 -0.3 -0.012 -3.7 -0.009 -3.8
Total (due to difference in endowments) 0.0781 34.2 0.084 36.7 0.004 1.8 0.091 28.8 0.065 20.9 0.023 9.9
Female Characteristics and Male Reward Structure
Z' FEMALE ∆β Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff Level % of Diff
Total due to differences in rewards 0.142 62.0 0.274 118.8 0.216 105.9 0.244 76.7 0.305 97.4 0.294 126.8
Due to difference in endowments: TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
∆Zβ MALE
Age -0.015 -6.5 0.004 1.8 -0.006 -2.8 -0.010 -3.2 -0.006 -1.9 -0.013 -5.4
Marital Status 0.013 6.0 0.007 3.0 0.036 17.5 0.030 9.3 0.023 7.4 0.009 3.8
Children < 7 -0.001 -0.5 0.000 0.0 -0.001 -0.5 -0.002 -0.7 0.000 -0.1 0.000 -0.1
Education 0.002 0.7 -0.023 -10.0 -0.065 -31.7 -0.068 -21.5 -0.016 -5.0 -0.057 -24.6
Occupations 0.055 24.0 -0.028 -12.2 0.016 7.8 0.090 28.5 -0.005 -1.8 -0.103 -44.2
Supervisor 0.009 4.0 0.001 0.6 0.001 0.4 0.003 0.8 -0.001 -0.4 0.080 34.5
Entrepeneurial Activity 0.004 1.9 0.002 0.9 0.004 1.9 0.004 1.4 0.002 0.6 0.007 3.0
Private sector 0.019 8.1 0.007 3.1 0.011 5.5 0.030 9.4 0.036 11.4 0.025 11.0
Regions 0.001 0.4 -0.014 -5.9 -0.008 -4.0 -0.002 -0.8 -0.024 -7.8 -0.011 -4.8
Total (due to differences in endowments) 0.086 38.0 -0.043 -18.8 -0.012 -5.9 0.074 23.3 0.008 2.6 -0.062 -26.8 
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       TABLE 10
Summary Statistics
          Males
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Log (Real Hourly Wage) 2.46 0.94 2.58 0.91 2.09 0.85 2.27 0.90 2.54 0.95 2.83 0.87
Log (Total Hrs Worked in Month) 5.10 0.49 5.13 0.37 5.10 0.38 5.13 0.37 5.12 0.42 5.14 0.37
Married 0.84 0.36 0.83 0.38 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.43 0.73 0.44 0.72 0.45
Children < 7 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Age 38.59 10.85 37.97 10.91 37.69 10.65 37.13 10.62 37.43 10.34 37.48 10.53
Age Squared 1607.0 859.8 1560.7 859.6 1533.8 820.6 1490.9 814.4 1507.5 795.9 1515.8 811.7
Technical/Medical Education 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
University/Postgrad Degree 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43
Vocation Training 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
High School Education 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22
Primary School or Less 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11
Private Sector Employee 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50
(Russian/Foreign-owned)
Manager 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.28
Professional 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33
Technical/Medical Field 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Clerk 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14
Service Worker 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23
Craft Worker 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
Operator 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42
Elementary/Unskilled 0.08 0.26 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Supervisor 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45
Entrepeneurial Activity 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.26 0.06 0.23
Moscow 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
West Siberia 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
Central 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38
Caucas 0.15 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34
East Siberia 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
Urals 0.14 0.34 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30
Volga-Vyatski Basin 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
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      TABLE 10A
Summary Statistics
         Females
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Log (Real Hourly Wage) 2.23 0.87 2.35 0.90 1.89 0.85 1.95 0.84 2.23 0.88 2.60 0.81
Log (Total Hours Worked in Mont 4.98 0.45 5.00 0.40 4.97 0.41 5.02 0.39 5.01 0.41 5.00 0.42
Married 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.58 0.49
Children < 7 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Age 37.51 8.62 37.81 8.81 37.43 9.26 37.94 9.69 37.41 9.83 37.57 9.74
Age Squared 1480.9 635.5 1506.9 650.1 1486.8 678.1 1533.4 721.8 1495.8 725.5 1506.7 724.7
Technical/Medical Education 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49
University/Postgrad Degree 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.32 0.46 0.29 0.46
Vocation Training 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44
High School Education 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22
Primary School or Less 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08
Private Sector Employee 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.42 0.49
('Russian/Foreign-owned)
Manager 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
Professional 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44
Technical/Medical Field 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43
Clerk 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
Service Worker 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Craft Worker 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
Operator 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Elementary/Unskilled 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
Supervisor 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
Entrepeneurial Activity 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
Moscow 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21
West Siberia 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.23
Central 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Caucas 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36
East Siberia 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Urals 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30
Volga-Vyatski Basin 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38 
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